Do firms lease to hedge? CEO risk-taking and operating lease intensity

Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk-taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.     

CEO compensation in EU telecom companies: Does the state design the right incentives?

This paper analyzes the structure of CEO pay in European fixed telecommunication companies, focusing on the impact of state ownership. Results show that, under the (partial or total) control of the state, the level of CEO compensation is lower and pay-performance sensitivity is higher than in privately-controlled firms. This finding suggests the state provides an incentive as well as a monitoring effect. However, when the state holds the majority of the shares, the pay level is significantly affected by the CEO power, suggesting that in these firms, CEOs are more likely to be entrenched with boards and succeed in raising their pay.     

Stock price crash risk and CEO power: Firm-level analysis

This study examines the impact of stock price crash risk on future CEO power. Using a large panel sample with 17,816 firm-year observations, we posit and find a significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power, suggesting that CEO power becomes smaller after stock price crashes. We also find that our results are stronger for firms with female CEOs and are largely driven by firms with shorter-tenure CEOs. In addition, we find that the significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power is diminished for firms with strong corporate governance. Our study responds to the call in Habib, Hasan, and Jiang (2018) by providing more empirical evidence on the consequences of stock price crash risk.     

股权再融资与企业现金分红

股权再融资往往意味着企业存在大量的融资需求,而实践中普遍存在的股权再融资后立即现金分红的现象有悖于募集资金的优序使用原则。基于此,本文从管理层自利视角出发,在对企业股权再融资后现金分红的行为偏好检验的基础上,进一步选取管理层薪酬增长率和企业股权质押活动作为管理层自利程度的代理变量,探索企业股权再融资后现金分红倾向的边界条件,为该行为背后的代理动机提供证明。基于2007~2017年所有A股上市公司样本,研究发现,企业的确存在股权再融资后立即现金分红的行为倾向;而较低的管理层薪酬增长率和企业股权质押活动会加剧企业股权融资对现金分红的促进作用。进一步研究发现,企业股权再融资活动会给现金分红带来消极的市场反应。上述研究结果表明,管理层自利是股权再融资的重要推动因素,而这一行为会给企业利益造成损害。     

论我国大气污染生态补偿法律机制的完善

大气污染生态补偿法律机制对于促进区域大气污染联合治理、实现大气污染治理法律正义、创新与完善生态补偿法律机制等具有重要意义。我国现有法律法规就大气污染生态补偿进行了原则性规定,特别是山东、陕西、湖北等地方性法规更是对大气污染生态补偿进行了探索性规范,为大气污染生态补偿法律机制完善提供了有益经验。但从总体来看,我国大气污染生态补偿法律机制尚存在缺乏专门法律支撑、生态补偿主体过窄、补偿方式单一、补偿标准不合理、法律责任不完善等问题。为促进生态文明战略与强化大气污染生态补偿的法律保障,我国应以科学理念为指导,采取有效措施推进大气污染生态补偿法律机制完善。     

国有企业高管薪酬管制与委托代理问题

由于国企高管的经营业绩难以被准确度量，加上监督约束机制不健全，高管的超额薪酬成为国企代理问题的一种典型表现，于是政府将高管薪酬管制作为应急措施来降低代理成本，缓解国企代理问题。采用双重差分法对2011—2018年A股上市公司的分析表明：第二次限薪令在有效限制国企高管薪酬水平的同时，没有对高管在职消费产生显著影响，有效降低了国企代理成本；但第二次限薪令也降低了薪酬激励效应，导致国企高管努力程度降低，由此造成的利益损失又成为新的代理成本。国企薪酬制度改革面临激励与管制的两难选择，应在国企分类改革的基础上对不同类型国企的高管采取不同的激励机制：对公益类及特殊行业的国企增强高管政治晋升激励，对竞争行业（营利性）国企则应在推向市场的同时放松薪酬管制，从而有效降低代理成本，解决国企代理问题。     

我国牧区草原生态补偿机制构建研究

［目的］通过构建一套科学、合理的牧区草原生态补偿机制，解决牧区近10年来主要实施的一系列生态治理项目和措施中存在的草原生态补偿标准普遍偏低、政策缺少灵活性、监管体系不够完善、缺乏相应保障机制等问题。［方法］通过对国内有关草原生态补偿机制相关文献分类梳理，基于我国牧区草原生态环境现状，对比分析国内外实践，总结国外成功经验，定性分析补偿机制要素，对草原生态补偿机制进行全面、系统地分析论述。［结果］我国牧区草原生态补偿主体应以各级政府为主； 补偿对象应包括牧区牧民、草原生态环境保护的投资者和建设者以及牧区地方政府； 因保护草原生态环境而导致牧区和牧民的发展权受限由此产生的机会成本作为草原生态补偿标准； 补偿方式以中央财政纵向转移支付为主，以市场补偿为辅的组合模式。保障机制需完善法律法规、公众参与、监督管理、绩效评估等方面建设。［结论］我国牧区草原生态补偿机制的构建须对补偿责任主体、补偿范围、补偿标准、补偿方式及补偿保障机制等各要素要进行整体性、系统性深入分析，才能确保草原生态补偿机制能够满足牧区实际需求，提供有力保障。     

基于CE模型的河南省耕地生态补偿额度研究

[目的]基于生态补偿利益主体的需求和支付意愿,充分考虑区域经济发展状态,测算具有弹性的生态补偿标准,确保生态补偿机制顺利运行。[方法]以河南省457份实地调查问卷为基础,采用选择实验法,建立由4个属性水平、7个选择集组成的生态价值属性集,测算受访对象生态补偿的支付意愿。[结果]城乡居民对于耕地资源景观与生态环境关注度最高,其次是耕地质量和耕地面积;农民和市民对于耕地生态价值属性满足的支付意愿存在显著差异性,农民支付意愿为2 060.55元/hm~2,市民支付意愿为3 396.15元/hm~2,两者相差近1 335.60元/hm~2,收入水平、环保意识是影响受访对象生态补偿支付意愿的最直接因素,但两者均认为耕地面积不变、耕地质量改善和耕地景观生态环境改善为最优选择。[结论]补偿额度应充分考虑相关利益主体的支付能力和意愿,将农民的支付意愿作为生态补偿下限,市民的支付意愿作为生态补偿上限,可建立具有一定弹性的生态补偿机制。     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contracting Under Endogenous Risk

Agents make decisions by trading off cost, return and risk. The literature, however, does not consider the impact of risk on action choice. We show that this tradeoff has important implications for the firm. First, the firm may provide no insurance in the salary. Since the agents action choice will determine her risk, the salary cannot compensate her for it. Second, the firm may not be able to design an incentive scheme to implement particularly risky actions. Finally, the firm may not be able to design a scheme in which the agent splits her effort across multiple tasks. This is particularly problematic for tasks that are technological substitutes.